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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A BRAND CALL-CENTER IN REVENUE RECOVERY
FOR HOSPITALITY FIRMS
Daniel J. Mount
And
Qu Xiao

ABSTRACT
As organizations gradually recognize that enhanced customer satisfaction leads to better
customer retention and profitability, the economic value of customers has been increasingly
studied in various industries and individual companies in the past decade (e.g., Goodman,
Ward, & Yanovsky, 1998; Reinartz & Kumar, 2000; Zeithaml, 2000). There has also been a
significant increase in research on service recovery (Brown, Cowles & Tuten, 1996).
However, very little research has aimed at the economic value of customers retained by
effective service recovery in general and none, specifically, in the hotel industry. This paper
presents a methodology to measure revenue recovery and the results of a six-year study on the
effectiveness of a hotel call-center in recovering revenue for the hotel brand. The results
show that the call-center has been effective in recovering revenue in that the recovery has
been significant and is greater than the administrative costs of the call-center operation.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A BRAND CALL-CENTER IN REVENUE
RECOVERY

As both business practices of organizations and focuses of marketing research, the
concepts of service recovery and customer retention have evolved over time. It is generally
believed that service recovery increases customer satisfaction (Brown, Cowles & Tuten, 1996;
Hepworth & Mateus, 1994); enhanced customer satisfaction leads to decreased customer
defection and increased customer retention (Buttle & Burton, 2002; Reichheld, 1993) and;
higher retention rate leads to improved profitability (Reichheld & Sasser, 1990; Zeithaml,
2000). The importance of service recovery and customer retention has been well researched.
Among the most widely reported benefits of customer retention are the following
(Narayandas, 1998): (1) resistance to counter-persuasion, (2) resistance to competitors’ offers,
(3) resistance to adverse expert opinion, (4) willingness to wait for products to become
available, (5) willingness to pay a premium and (6) willingness to recommend (word of
mouth). In addition to the direct effects of service recovery on resolving customer problems
and increasing customer satisfaction, and consequently increasing customer retention, service
recovery also plays an important role in indirectly assisting service quality improvement in
the long-run because it provides valuable information for organizations to improve their
service systems and avoid future customer defections (Brown, Cowles & Tuten, 1996;
Goodman, Ward, & Yanovsky, 1998).
On the other hand, although it is well supported that service recovery increases
customer satisfaction, many studies show that increasing customer satisfaction does not
necessarily increase retention and profit. Reichheld (1993) found that customer satisfaction
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was higher among the most unprofitable customers, and between 65% and 85% of customers
who defect were satisfied or very satisfied with the organizations they left. Zeithaml (2000),
citing Storbacka & Luukinen (1996), also found that customer satisfaction was higher among
the most unprofitable customers. In the auto industry, satisfaction scores average from 85 to
95 percent, while repurchase rates average only 40 percent (Reichheld, 1993). Moreover,
research suggests that even increasing customer retention does not always lead to increases in
profitability. In some instances increasing the retention of unprofitable customers will reduce
the company’s profits (Christopher, Payne, & Ballantyne, 2002). Researchers argue that most
customer satisfaction measurements are not designed to examine customer profitability,
therefore better measurements should be developed to provide insight into the economic value
of customers (e.g., Christopher, et al., 2002; Hepworth & Mateus, 1994; Reichheld, 1993;
Zeithaml, 2000). In a study conducted in various industries by Reichheld (2003), the most
effective predictors of future profitability are asking the customers the likelihood of
recommending the product/service to others and the likelihood of repurchasing.
A national survey across different industries (e.g., IT, communication, clothing,
residential service, newspaper subscription, etc.) reveals that nearly half the marketing
managers and thirty percent of sales managers do not know how many customers their firms
lost annually (Griffin and Lowenstein, 2001). Hepworth and Mateus (1994) report that fewer
than thirty percent of two hundred Canadian companies’ managers believed their customer
satisfaction efforts added economic value to their bottom line, and fewer than two percent
were able to translate the increased customer satisfaction into financial improvements. A
study on marketing directors and senior marketing managers in 225 large UK organizations
shows that companies are spending less on retaining customers than on acquiring new
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customers, and it indicates that very few organizations measure the economic value of their
customer retention strategies (Christopher, et al., 2002).
The focus of this research is on customer call centers. The purpose of a call center is
to provide a feedback and response mechanism for customers of a company. Customers,
usually dissatisfied customers, will contact the call center through a toll-free number.
Customers have usually experienced a service failure and are giving the company an
opportunity to provide a recovery response. This is a critical juncture in the service
experience. The continued business of the customer may very likely be at stake based on the
response provided by the call center personnel.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The impact of service recovery and customer retention on profitability has been
researched in many industries. It is reported that, across most industries, an average of twenty
percent of customers that encountered service failure switched to the competition (Goodman
& Ward, 1993). Reversing this analysis, service recovery helps to retain revenue from at least
one of every five complaints. Researchers admit that a relatively small increase in customer
retention will drive relatively large increases in profits. A widely referenced study conducted
by Reichheld and Sasser (1990), provided evidence from multiple companies in different
industries that reducing customer defections by five percent could generate profit increases
from twenty-five percent to eighty-five percent. As an average company loses between
twenty to forty percent of its customers every year, simply cutting defections in half will more
than double the company’s growth rate (Griffin and Lowenstein, 2001; Reichheld & Sasser,
1990).
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In addition to the direct profits generated by recovered customer’s repurchases,
Reichheld and Sasser (1990) suggest that other indirect economic benefits of customer
retention such as less price sensitivity, greater willingness to purchase other products of the
company and lower service costs should be taken into consideration to calculate a customer’s
real monetary value. In addition, service recovery can lower the total marketing expenditure
by substantially reducing the cost of acquiring new customers.
One important benefit of calculating economic impact that has not been cited is using
the economic impact results as a performance measure for a call-center, an operation within a
company that handles various customer related issues via answering inbound phone calls from
customers and/or placing outbound calls to customers. Although a call-center is only visible
as an 800 number to the customers, it is indeed an important function of customer services to
ensure customer satisfaction. Call-centers are typically cost-centers, there is generally no
direct revenue reported by these units. By calculating economic impact, companies can get a
better understanding of the economic contribution made by the efforts of the call center.
Although no research has been found from the perspective of determining the
economic value of recovered hotel guests, previous research in other settings has suggested a
few methods of measurement on the economic value of customer retention. Berry (1993)
suggested that firms can measure the cost of poor service quality by multiply the number of
customers who defect by the profit contribution of a customer. To take into consideration the
concept of lifetime value, Reinartz and Kumar (2000) proposed the following formula in their
research on a large catalog retailer:
36

LTπ i = ∑ (GC ti − C ti )(
t =1

1
)t
1 + 0.125

where LTπ i = individual net present lifetime profit for 36 months
4

GC ti = gross contribution in month t for customer i
C ti = cost in month t for customer i (cost refers to the catalog mailing cost)
0.125 = monthly discount rate based on a 15% annual rate, which equals the
U.S. prime rate at the time of the study plus 7%.
Another approach was applied by Technical Assistance Research Programs (TARP), a
Virginia-based customer service research and consulting firm, on the economic impact of call
centers of different industries on customer retention (Goodman, et al., 1998). In this study,
the customer satisfaction levels have been classified as satisfied (completely satisfied) and
mollified (customers are not completed satisfied but the action was acceptable), and these two
levels of satisfaction are computed separately based on different service recovery rates. To
calculate the lost profits from complaints, the following equation is drawn from the TARP
study:
LP = S × P × C × SC (or MC ) × NPsc (or NPmc)

where LP = total lost profits due to service failure
S = number of sales per customer per year
P = profit per sale
C = number of customers who complained
SC = percentage of satisfied complaints
MC = percentage of mollified complaints
NPsc = percentage of customers who will not repurchase even if satisfied
NPmc = percentage of mollified customers who will not repurchase
The total lost profits can be obtained by adding up the lost profits from the satisfied
complaints and the lost profits from the mollified complaints. It is noticeable that this study
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does not compute the recovered revenue directly, while the method of calculating lost profits
from the complaints could be easily reversed for calculating the economic value of recovered
customers.
While the two previous measurements might be effective in their respective settings,
they are not appropriate for studies on the call centers of the hotel or similar industries due to
two significant limitations. First, profit or cost has to be known in both approaches: in
Reinartz and Kumar’s (2000) formula, unit cost data is required to derive the profit, and the
TARP formula also asks for profit per sale information. However, using profits for a large
brand, hotels or others, may be questionable since the profit margins of the various hotels may
vary widely and the system-wide profit margin would have to be known. As a call center
usually represents only one brand, the revenue recovered is more critical to brand
management, and operating profits must be left to the individual operations. Second, while
revenue could be substituted for profits in the TARP formula, the formula also proves
problematic in that it only considers satisfied or mollified customers. Another possible
outcome of the call-center interaction is that the customer is even more dissatisfied, or less
likely to return after a call-center interaction because of the interaction or (lack of) outcome
experienced. While the TARP formula accounts for satisfied or mollified customers who
subsequently indicate that they will still not repurchase, it does not account for the customers
that express dissatisfaction with the call-center interaction. Through proposing an approach
incorporating all possible outcomes that could be produced by the interaction between
customers and call centers, this research seeks to overcome the limitations of previous
research and to more effectively measure economic impact of call centers in terms of revenue
recovered.
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METHODOLOGY
This study is designed to estimate the revenue recovered by a call center of a major
mid-scale hotel company with over a thousand mid-scale properties worldwide. Telephone
surveys were completed seven times over a six-year period, including two surveys completed
in 2002 under the direction of the sponsoring company. Following Reichheld (2003), we
asked the customer about their recent experiences with the call center and the likelihood of
returning to a hotel of the company in each survey. The number of responses for each survey
period ranged from 282 to 360. A goal of 360 responses was set to achieve a representative
sample of what is a large population (annual calls to the company during the survey period
ranged from 170,000 to 221,000). However, due to research budget constraints, the total
responses may have been less than the 360-responses goal in a survey period. The variables
in this study were based on the answers to three questions (number of nights per year in brand
hotels, intent to return pre- and post-call center experience) of a much longer survey that
addressed many aspects of the call center experience.
Revenue recovery was calculated with the following model for the first three survey
periods. As the variable of interest in revenue recovery is intent to return, the scenario that
most correlated with intent to return was selected as the appropriate method for calculating
revenue recovery. The basic methodology is:
RR = ADR * RN * FSM * SEN * SA
where RR = revenue recovered
ADR = system-wide average daily rate (provided by company)
RN = annual room nights spend at hotel brand (survey response)
FSM = frequency of scale movement on intent to return
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SEN = degree of scale movement
SA = an adjustment factor to project the sample to the population
With any new economic model, different scenarios should be tested to determine
which scenario best represents the underlying data. For this study, four initial scenarios were
tested. These scenarios are defined in Table 1.

(Insert Table 1 about here)

Scenario number one (ACTSEN) utilized actual annual room nights reported by each
respondent in the calculation and a “sensitive” scale movement. SEN represents the degree of
scale movement. This variable is necessitated by the consideration of various scenarios to be
tested. Each question utilized a five-point scale with five representing “very likely” to return
and one representing “very unlikely” to return. Each scale point is considered to represent a
twenty-five percent interval in intention to return. Very likely is assigned a value of one
hundred percent, likely a value of seventy-five percent, maybe a value of fifty percent,
unlikely a value of twenty-five percent and very unlikely a value of zero percent. The
“degree” of recovery is based on the movement on the scale between pre and post-intent to
return measures. If a respondent’s post-intent to return shifted one place, from maybe to
likely (or unlikely), they are considered to be “twenty-five percent recovered (or lost),” and
twenty-five percent of their annual room nights are recovered (or lost). Two of the scenarios
will consider a “sensitive” scale shift, a degree of recovery or loss is considered based on any
scale movement, both positive (1 to 5, 2 to 5, 3 to 5, 4 to 5, 1 to 4, 2 to 4, 3 to 4, 1 to 3, 2 to 3,
1 to 2) and negative (reverse of all possibilities listed previously). The other scenario utilizing
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the sensitive scale shift is the AVGSEN scenario. This, in addition to the sensitive scale
calculation, uses the average annual room nights reported by the entire sample rather than
calculating the actual annual room nights by individual case. This may reduce the effect of
outliers in the actual annual room night calculations.
Previous research suggests that the relationship between loyalty behaviors including
intent to return and profitability may not be linear: it is possible that slight movements of one
place on the scale are not an adequate indicator of any change of actual behavior, and change
may be only indicated by a more significant shift (Reichheld, 2003). To take this possibility
into consideration, two other scenarios consider a “general” rather than previously stated
“sensitive” scale movement. Only scale movements of two or more places, positive (1 to 5, 2
to 5, 3 to 5, 1 to 4, 2 to 4, and 1 to 3) and negative (reverse of all possibilities listed previously)
are considered. The ACTGEN scenario uses the general scale movement calculation with the
actual annual room nights and the AVGGEN scenario uses the general scale movement
calculation with the average annual room nights.
The frequency measure (FSM) in the formula is the actual number of cases showing
scale movement. For example, if two respondents indicate a movement from two on the preintent to return to four on the post-intent to return then the frequency for this scale movement
is two. The frequency is determined for each of the possible scale movements, both positive
(1 to 5, 2 to 5, 3 to 5, 4 to 5, 1 to 4, 2 to 4, 3 to 4, 1 to 3, 2 to 3, 1 to 2) and negative (reverse
of all possibilities listed previously). The sample adjustment measure (SA) is determined by
dividing the total number of annual calls received by the company by the sample size. The
revenue recovery indicated in the sample is then multiplied by this factor to get the revenue
recovery on an annualized basis for the company.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The scenario results for the first three survey periods (1999-2001) are presented in
Table 2. The 1999 survey was completed in the Fall of 1999 and the 2000 survey was
completed in the Spring of 2000. The sponsoring company did not have updated system-wide
numbers for the 2000 survey so 1999 numbers were used. It can be seen from a visual review
that actual room night scenarios, ACTSEN and ACTGEN, do not best represent the intent to
return measure as the 2001 revenue recovery figures are less than 1999 while the intent to
return has increased by a greater margin. Between the AVGSEN and AVGGEN scenarios,
the correlation analysis of those measures to the changes in intent to return supports the
AVGSEN scenario (correlation coefficient of .99 for AVGSEN and .87 for AVGGEN).
While correlation is not the sole criteria for scenario selection, it does support the visual
selection of AVGSEN as the best scenario to measure economic impact.

(Insert Table 2 about here)

Table 3 presents the findings for the seven survey periods using the AVGSEN
scenario. The revenue recovery has been positive for all seven survey periods, ranging from
$2.1 million to $7.5 million. All of the pre and post-intent to return measures were
statistically significant except for the first year as shown in Table 3. Based on other
information collected in the 1999 survey, the company began an aggressive plan to offer
compensation in the form of gift certificates to more callers. The result can be seen the
following year with the 250% increase in revenue recovery from $2.1 million to $7.5 million.
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After that year, the company reduced the gift certificate compensation due to internal
considerations. While the revenue recovery did decrease, the statistical impact was still
significant in pre and post-intent to return measures. The 2004 increase is directly attributable
to the increased average daily rate and call volume.

(Insert Table 3 about here)

To determine a true economic impact, the call center would reduce the revenue
recovery by the cost of the call center. While that information was not made available to this
research, the company has stated that, in all cases, the revenue recovered exceeded the annual
cost of the call center. The final economic impact would then have to consider the
incremental recovery reduced to address individual profit margins at the hotels, generally
ranging from twenty to fifty percent. While it seems that the revenue recovery is being
reduced significantly to get to economic impact, the “hidden” benefits need to be considered
in the work. First, if one alternative is to not have a call center, the dissatisfaction of callers
would be increased by the aggravation of not finding a call center outlet. The calculation in
this case would start with the cost of the call center gained, but then would have to factor in
the cost of the dissatisfied guests who would not find the call center outlet. This would be
extremely difficult to do, and logic would suggest that this number would be tremendous and
the practice would be unacceptable. The first purpose of having a call center is to provide an
outlet, what will really distinguish the operation is the effectiveness in recovering revenue for
the brand. A mediocre, poorly trained call center will provide an outlet for the guest but may
not generate revenue to cover its costs. If the argument is that a company must provide the
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outlet, it is in the best interest of the company to study how the call center can be more
effective in recovering revenue. If the revenue recovery is positive, the call center truly
justifies its existence in the structure of brand management.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This research investigates the revenue recovered by the call center of a major hotel
company. Through proposing a methodology to measure revenue recovery, this study is
expected to expand on the previous research on the measurement of service recovery and
customer profitability. The results of this six-year study show that the studied call center has
continuously recovered significant revenue for the brand. The findings indicate that revenue
recovery, if appropriately measured, is a reliable indicator of the effectiveness of the call
center. As the revenue recovery proves essential in documenting the value and efforts of the
call center to brand affiliates, the results of this research suggest that a call center could
undertake the revenue recovery exercise to determine how effective it is in recovering revenue
for the brand. Those who ultimately pay for the call center can therefore see that the call
center operation is having a positive impact on brand performance.
While the proposed methodology of measuring revenue recovery is proven effective,
the findings of this research should be interpreted with caution due to its limitations. First, a
more accurate calculation on the economic value of a call center would need to subtract the
cost of the call center from the revenue it recovers. When such data becomes available in the
future, continued research measuring both revenue recovery and the cost of the call center
would reveal a more complete picture on the effectiveness of the call center. In addition,
although the studied company is fairly representative in the lodging industry, its product
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focuses primarily on mid-scale hotels. However, it is reasonable to expect that customers of
different types of hotels (e.g., luxury, upscale, mid-scale, economy) may have different
expectations and thus may respond differently to the efforts of the call centers. Future
research that studies multiple brands and multiple companies with different hotel types would
be very informative in this regard. Furthermore, revenue recovery is only a measurement of
the direct economic impact of the call center. Indirect economic outcomes, such as generating
referred business from positive word of mouth, providing information to improve the service
product and consequently reducing future customer defections, etc., could also be important
benefits of the call center. Future research might be extended to take the indirect benefits into
consideration and therefore gain deeper understanding on the economic value of the call
center.
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Table 1.
Definitions of scenarios.
Abbreviation

Definition

ACT

Actual room nights for each case used in the calculation

AVG

Average room nights for the entire sample used in the calculation

SEN

Any scale movement (i.e., 2 to 3, 5 to 4) used in the calculation

GEN

Only scale movements of two or more (i.e., 2 to 4, 5 to 3) used in the calculation

ACTSEN

Actual room nights with a sensitive scale

AVGSEN

Average room nights with a sensitive scale

ACTGEN

Actual room nights with a general scale

AVGGEN

Average room nights with a general scale

Table 2.
Revenue recovery for three survey periods (1999-2001).
1999

2000

2001

Pre-guest relations intent to return

2.95

2.88

2.82

Post-guest relations intent to return

3.07

3.27a

3.09b

Average Daily Ratec

64.92

64.92

71.22

188,100

188,100

180,000

Volume of phone callsc
Avg. night used for “avg.” measure

d

6.40e

6.05

6.71

Actsen

$3,708,915

$11,450,242

$3,689,555

Avgsen

$2,146,333

$7,521,190

$4,621,340

Actgen

$3,182,141

$8,698,107

$910,024

Avggen

$1,040,646

$5,621,900

$1,392,733

a. statistically significant at p<.001
b. statistically significant at p<.01
c. Information received from sponsoring company
d. Actual number of 7.64 reduced due to outliers
e. Actual number of 7.19 reduced due to outliers
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Table 3.
Revenue recovery for entire study period
1999

2000

2.95
2.88
Pre-guest
relations intent
to return
3.07
3.27
Post-guest
relations intent
to return
Revenue
$2,146,333 $7,521,190
recovery
Average Daily
64.92
64.92
Ratea
Volume of
188,100
188,100
phone callsa
6.05
6.71b
Avg. night
used for “avg.”
measure
1999
not statistically significant
2000
statistically significant at p<.001
2001
statistically significant at p<.001
2002S statistically significant at p<.001
2002F statistically significant at p<.05
2003
statistically significant at p<.001
2004
statistically significant at p<.01

2001

2002S

2002F

2003

2004

2.82

2.99

2.91

2.89

2.62

3.09

3.20

3.06

3.11

2.85

$4,621,340

$4,176,936

$3,425,047

$4,871,999

$6,349,719

71.22

70.87

72.48

70.65

87.97

180,000

186,000

187,000

189,500

211,226

6.40c

6.00

6.83

6.68d

6.10

a. Information received from sponsoring company
b. Actual number of 7.64 reduced due to outliers
c. Actual number of 7.19 reduced due to outliers
d. Actual number of 7.62 reduced due to outliers
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